is a native of Hungary and a graduate of Corvinus University of Budapest (International Relations, BA) and King's College, University of London (European Studies, MA) and the founder and editor-in-chief of both DiploMaci (a popular Hungarian foreign affairs blog) and The European Strategist. His principal interests are in the field of contemporary British and Hungarian politics, the European Union and interesting developments in the global economy. He was previously employed as a foreign affairs journalist, but now he works in the private sector.

2 responses to “A modest proposal for saving the euro”

  1. Protesilaos Stavrou

    Dear Aron A. Nemeth,
    I agree with your overall logic that any undisciplined member cannot be part of the euro (back in 1999 Belgium one of the original euro member-states had a public debt similar to that of Greece today, which exceeds by a lot the criterion set out by the Stability and Growth Pact). I also agree that the countries of the European periphery do not belong to the euro (unless their economies are fundamentally restructured).

    However I would like to point out a couple of things.

    The first is that if the single currency does not include the peripheral countries, then all exports from the surplus countries (center/north) will not be as consumable in the periphery, thus the economies of the countries that are left with the euro will not be as prosperous. The euro facilitates trade and builds upon the logic of economies of scale – the bigger the economy, the more efficient certain industries are (this is absolutely true for the exporting sectors of the surplus countries). Hence a reduction in the size of the market will translate into a diminution of the efficiency of those industries. In short the eurozone will become a less attractive area for trade even for its own members. You see, peripheral countries, apart from running deficits, are also consumers. In fact those deficits were taken up in the first place to consume the exports of the surplus countries.

    The second is that the euro is a very good currency only in times of prosperity, since it allows for unobstructed free trade among member-states, the ECB has a strict monetary policy that prevents it from heating up the economy and it is seen as a very powerful global currency that many central banks like to keep in their reserves.

    But in recessionary times, such as today's, the structural flaws of the euro are the primary cause of increasing the impact of a recession by creating asymmetric shocks among member-states.

    This is due to the design of the euro, which has been modeled to the Deutschmark, thus adopting a one-size-fits-all rationale (the policy of the Deutschmark was fundamentally different from that of many other countries but it nonetheless became the policy of all). Instead of creating a single currency upon the middle ground, one that would serve the diverging needs of its members (which wouldn't make sense for Germany and others to enter of course), European leaders built a currency that greatly benefited only one group of states – those who could adopt to the German model. The euro was from the outset a straitjacket for most member-states, who simply could not become as good as Germany. This immediately creates a gradual divergence in competitiveness among member-states, as those who could adopt experienced considerable growth in their economies, while those who could not adopt, had to loan money to cover for the increasing gap in competitiveness. This wouldn't have been a real problem if there was a fiscal union in place. That is a system/mechanism that would allow for the redistribution of the accumulated surpluses (just like national governments do in their regional policies, to prevent the state from breaking apart). These are certain structural flaws that make a recession much worse for certain members.

    For the euro to survive this ongoing crisis, it needs a fundamental redesign that will address its systemic flaws. The idea of expelling the less effective members will not work in favor of the euro, since in the occurrence of such an incident the market pressures will be immense, the euro's credibility and importance will be reduced and thus its role on the global economy will be considerably downgraded. Moreover the eurozone will be diminished and thus the benefit which derives from the "economies of scale" effect will become immaterial. So less incentives to keep the euro.

    Keep up the good work,
    Protesilaos Stavrou

    1. Aron A. Nemeth

      Dear Protesilaos,

      Many thanks for your interesting and thoughtful comment, I think you are absolutely right! I especially agree with your last argument that only with a serious restructuring / redesign can the euro survive. However, as we all see it, the leaders of our Union are painfully behind history. Of course, it must be very hard to be a prime minister, president, chancellor, etc. but my personal view is that it is clearly shameful that they are kicking the can down the road without thinking about the possible grave consequences and the future, OUR future.

      Best,

      Aron

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